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ABSTRACT
Following up the proposal of (Klimentova, Viana, Pe-
droso and Santos 2019), we consider the usage of a com-
pensation scheme for multi-country kidney exchange
programmes to balance out the benefits of cooperation.
The novelty of our study is to base the target solution
on the Shapley value of the corresponding TU-game,
rather than on marginal contributions. We compare
the long term performances of the above two fairness
concepts by conducting simulations on realistically gen-
erated kidney exchange pools.
INTRODUCTION
Currently, no cure exists for Chronic Kidney Disease
(CKD). Dialysis is a common treatment for CKD, but
is costly, and has poor life expectancy and quality of life
for patients. Transplantation is the preferred treatment
of choice, but there is a shortage of deceased donors, so
the waiting lists for a deceased donor kidney are long.
The other alternative for transplantation is living do-
nation. However even if there is a willing donor for the
patient, the donor and recipient may be immunologi-
cally incompatible.
A Kidney Exchange Programme (KEP) is a platform
that allows incompatible recipient-donor pairs (RDPs)
to exchange their incompatible donor organ for a com-
patible donor organ. In Europe, as surveyed in 2016
(Biro´, Haase-Kromwijk, van de Klundert et al. 2019),
ten countries have operated a KEP. The first was the
programme of the Netherlands in 2004. In Europe, the
UK programme is the largest, with an average of 135
transplants per year.
In the European KEPs matching runs are conducted
at regular time intervals, typically every 3 months. Vir-
tual crossmatch tests are used to estimate compatibil-
ity between all donors and recipients, and the results
of said tests are used to determine optimal exchanges.
Compatibility is represented by a directed graph, where
the vertices denote the incompatible recipient-donor
pairs and the directed arcs denote the potential com-
patible transplants between the pairs. The objective of
the model is usually to maximise the number of trans-
plants. In advanced KEPs, IP models are used to solve
this problem (Abraham, Blum and Sandholm 2007).
For ethical reasons, the operations in an exchange
cycle should happen simultaneously. Hence in prac-
tice logistical constraints create an upper bound on vi-
able cycles. In Europe, the most common such bound
in KEPs is 3 (e.g. the UK, Spain and Belgium), but
there are examples for bound of 2 (e.g. France) and
4 (Netherlands) as well (Biro´ et al. 2019). Besides
the number of the transplants, further considerations
are given for improving the quality of the transplants
or the long term success of the scheme by prioritising
hard-to-match pairs, e.g. sensitive patients or patients
with blood type O. A complete list of objectives in Eu-
ropean KEPs and their possible implementations with
IP techniques can be found in (Biro´, van de Klundert,
Manlove et al. 2020).
In some programmes, the usage of non-directed
donors (NDDs) is also allowed. In most countries an
NDD is an altruistic donor, who has no paired recipient,
but they would offer their kidney to any recipient in the
pool. Another possible NDD can be a deceased donor.
In these cases, the operations can be performed consec-
utively. Hence these donors may initiate longer chains
involving numerous pairs (Ashlagi and Roth 2014).
Larger KEP pools may result in a higher number of
transplants, and merging pools can bring extra ben-
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efits due to the increased number of options. In a
multi-country Kidney Exchange Programmes (mKEP)
the national KEPs merge their pools. In the last few
years, there several such collaborations have been es-
tablished in Europe. Since 2016 the Czech Republic
and Austria started a collaboration by joining the pools
of two transplant centres (Bo¨hmig, Fronek, Slavcev,
Fischer, Berlakovich and Viklicky 2017). In 2018 a col-
laboration started between Italy, Portugal and Spain
(Valent´ın, Garcia., Costa, Bolotinha, Guirado, Vistoli,
Breda, Fiaschetti and Dominguez-Gil 2019), and Scan-
diatransplant has started to coordinate a joint scheme
in 2019 for Sweden, Norway and Denmark (STEP
Documentation 2016).
There are two types of collaboration possible for join-
ing the pool in an mKEP. In the so-called Consecutive
runs (CR) the countries first find the optimal solutions
separately on their national pools; then they consider
an international pool on the remaining pairs. An ex-
ample for this is the Spanish-Italian-Portuguese collab-
oration (Valent´ın et al. 2019). The other possibility is
the Merged pool (MP) collaboration, where the coun-
tries merge their national pools from the beginning of
the optimisation process. This concept is present in the
Austro-Czech and the Scandinavian programmes.
From the point of view of optimisation, an mKEP
can be modelled with a similar compatibility graph,
where the objective is to find the maximal number of
transplants. However, in an mKEP, there are multiple
countries involved, so the pairs of a cycle may belong
to different countries, which may increase the logistical
difficulty of the programme. Furthermore, the coun-
tries may have different constraints and objectives.
When multiple transplant centres collaborate in a
regional or national KEP, it is crucial that all partici-
pants receive fair benefits. In (Ashlagi and Roth 2011),
(Ashlagi and Roth 2012) the authors suggest that in-
dividual rationality (IR) of the centres should be guar-
anteed as a constraint in the optimisation in order to
incentivise centres to reveal all of their RDPs in the pro-
gramme. The constraint of iIR would guarantee that
each centre gets as many transplants as they would
make without the collaboration.
European mKEPs differ to US KEPs in a num-
ber of ways. In Europe the national KEPs conduct
their matching runs at regular intervals, whilst the US
KEPs operate on a daily basis due to the competition
among the alternative programmes (Agarwal, Ashlagi,
Azevedo, Featherstone and Karaduman 2018). In Eu-
rope the countries have different health care systems
and various performance of their deceased programmes,
so their KEPs are also different in pool sizes, their reg-
ulations and also in their distributions of RDPs, whilst
in the US the pools of the transplant centres are more
similar to each other. The largest national programme
in the US, the National Kidney Registry, uses a scor-
ing system to incentivise the transplant centres to fully
register all of their pairs, and the registration of easy-
to-match pairs and altruistic donors are awarded bonus
scores to ensure fairness among centres.
When the objective of the mKEP is to obtain the
maximal number of transplants, the benefits from the
collaboration can be unbalanced across countries. It
means that some countries would proportionally in-
crease their number of transplants less than other coun-
tries, if one considered the benefit they brought to the
pool. The paper by (Klimentova et al. 2019) investi-
gated the fairness of an mKEP by proposing the us-
age of a compensation scheme. The authors presented
an extended MILP model and algorithm to make an
mKEP fairer when running for a long period of time.
The process is based on a credit system that tracks and
balances out the benefits for the contributors. The au-
thors use two fair-values for the determination of the
contribution of each participant.
The Shapley value is a well-known solution concept
from the field of cooperative game theory (Shapley
1953), that satisfies four important fairness axioms.
An mKEP can be considered as a game with trans-
ferable utility (TU-game), where the players are the
participating countries, and the value of a coalition is
the number of transplants these countries can achieve
together in the collaboration. Several recent articles
investigated an mKEP as a cooperative game, study-
ing the Nash-equilibria (Carvalho, Lodi, Pedroso and
Viana 2017), (Carvalho and Lodi 2019) and the core
(Biro´, Kern, Pa´lvo¨lgyi and Paulusma 2019) of the cor-
responding games. In this paper, we compare one of
the fair-values, the Benefit value, used in (Klimentova
et al. 2019) to the Shapley value. Our results show that
the Shapley value provides similar effects as the Benefit
value, essentially giving better outcomes for the larger
countries and worse for the smaller countries, that can
be seen as fairer from the point of view of their value-
adding contributions. However, we found the compen-
sation scheme with the Shapley value more stable than
with the Benefit value respecting the dynamic biases
from the fair values.
FAIRNESS MODELS FOR MKEP
First we describe the standard KEP model and the
basic IP formulations, and then we introduce the con-
cept of dynamic compensation schemes.
Notation
Let D(V,A) denote a directed compatibility graph D,
where V corresponds to the recipient-donor pairs and
A corresponds to the compatible transplants. The arc
(i, j) represent the compatibility between the donor of
pair i and the recipient of pair j, hence the arc only
exists if donor i is compatible with recipient j. Let C
denote the set of cycles up to length K. Let each cycle
c be a set of arcs and let V (c) denote the set of vertices
covered by cycle c.
We can include NDDs in the model as follows. For
each NDD we add a vertex, which has outgoing arcs
as any other vertex in the graph representing possible
donations from the NDD. We also add incoming arcs
to the NDD vertex from all the vertices representing
RDPs. The latter dummy arcs will correspond to do-
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nations at the end of the NDD-chain that are either not
performed or the donation is from the last living donor
to the deceased waiting list.
In the international collaboration, let N denote the
set of participating countries, where the set of RDPs
is partitioned according to countries as follows: V =
V 1 ∪ V 2 ∪ · · · ∪ V |N |. The set of arcs An denotes the
arcs pointing to the pool of the country n, denoted by
V n. Note that A = A1 ∪A2 ∪ · · · ∪A|N |.
Model with the individual rationality constraint
There are two types of basic IP models known in
the literature for maximising the number of transplants
in a KEP. One is the so-called edge-formulation, and
the other one is the cycle-formulation (Abraham, Blum
and Sandholm 2007). The edge-formulation considers
the arcs of the graph as the variables of the model.
In the cycle formulation, all of the possible cycles are
enumerated, and each cycle is represented by a binary
variable.
Both formulations are usable in the multi-country sit-
uation, however the cycle-formulation is usually faster
to solve (Abraham, Blum and Sandholm 2007). Hence
we used this formulation in our computational analysis.
As in (Klimentova et al. 2019), we also study a cycle-
formulation model with the IR constraint. Let Zn be
the number of transplant that country n would accom-
plish without any collaboration. The modelM(C) con-
siders the IR constraints in the maximisation of the
number of transplants:
M(C) : max
∑
c∈C
|c|xc (IR:obj)
subject to ∑
c:i∈V (c)
xc ≤ 1 ,∀i ∈ V, (IR:1)
∑
c∈C
|c|nxc ≥ Zn ,∀n ∈ N, (IR:2)
xc ∈ {0, 1} ∀c ∈ C.
Where |c|n denotes the number of recipients of coun-
try n in cycle c. Constraints (IR:1) enforce each RDP
to participate in at most one cycle. Constraints (IR:2)
is the IR constraint; they ensure that each country re-
ceives as many transplants in the mKEP as it could
have achieved alone.
Static fair model
LetM∗ denote the optimum of modelM(C). When
multiple countries start a collaboration, the model may
result in an unfair solution. Some of the participants
may increase the number of transplants significantly,
but the increase for others may not be that large. The
next model, introduced by (Klimentova et al. 2019)
minimises the difference between the number of trans-
plants and the fair-values of the countries. The fair-
value is computed with respect to the contribution of
the participants. Let ψn denote the fair-value of coun-
try n. And let δn be the absolute deviation variable,
which shows the difference between the number of pos-
sible transplants and the fair-value of country n. Under
this notation, the model is written as follows:
F(C, ψ) : min
∑
n∈N
δn (1)
subject to
(IR:1), (IR:2),
∑
c∈C
|c|xc ≥M∗, (2)
δn ≥
∑
c∈C
|c|nxc − ψn ∀n ∈ N, (3)
δn ≥ ψn −
∑
c∈C
|c|nxc ∀n ∈ N, (4)
xc ∈ {0, 1}, δn ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ C,∀n ∈ N.
The objective function (1) is to minimise the absolute
deviation between the real and the fair-values of each
country. Constraints (3)-(4) define the absolute devia-
tions, which is δn = |ψn −∑c∈C |c|nxc|. In this model,
the objective is to find a solution which is as close to
the fair-values as possible, without the reduction of the
total number of transplants. Hence the constraint (2)
guarantees that introducing fairness will not reduce the
number of transplants.
Dynamic fairness model
A fair solution may not exist in a single period of an
mKEP. Therefore (Klimentova et al. 2019) proposed an
algorithm to guarantee the fairness of the collaboration
in the long run. Let t denote a period when a match-
ing is performed in the mKEP. The programme is fair
if the differences between the fair-values and the actual
transplants are small in general. For the consideration
of the past runs, we introduce credits for each coun-
try. When one country got less transplants in previous
periods than it should, as per fair-value indications, it
should get more transplant in the current period, indi-
cated by a positive credit.
Let τnt denote the target value of country n in the
period t. The target value of a country depends on
the previous periods’ credits (cnt ), and the fair value
of the current period (ψnt ). We call the credit as the
difference between the previous periods’ target value
and the number of transplants obtained:
cnt = τ
n
t−1 − snt−1 (5)
Where the snt−1 denotes the number of transplants
that country n obtained in the previous period. There-
fore the target value of the country n in period t can
be written as:
τnt = ψ
n
t + c
n
t (6)
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At the beginning of an mKEP τn0 = s
n
0 = 0 for all
country. The algorithm differs a bit in the two types of
collaborations. Let {MP} denote of the merged pools
case and {CR} the case of the consecutive runs.
Algorithm 1 Dynamic fairness algorithm
Require: C and C\ for n ∈ N , and the credit, cnt .
1: {MP; CR} Find the maximal number of transplants
that the countries would conclude without the col-
laboration: Zn.
2: {CR} Remove the pairs of the optimal solution of
the national matching from the pools. Then create
the graph for the remaining pairs.
3: {MP} Solve theM(C) forM∗. In the case of {CR}
it is enough to solve the modelM(C) without con-
straint (IR:2).
4: {MP; CR} Calculate the fair-value ψn.
5: {MP; CR} Determine the target value: τnt = ψnt +
cnt .
6: {MP} Solve F(C, τunionsq), in the {CR} case the (IR:2)
constraint is redundant.
7: {MP; CR} Save result, calculate the transplant
(st), determine the remaining pairs and compute
the credit cnt .
THE FAIR VALUES
In the previous section, the algorithm is based on
a fair allocation, with fair share ψn for each country
n. In (Klimentova et al. 2019) the authors used two
different fair values, the Benefit and the Potential.
The Potential value is the number of additional
transplants in an optimal mKEP that includes this
country compared to the number of transplants in the
mKEP if said country was excluded. The Benefit
value is the result of dividing the potential value by
the number of recipients within that country’s individ-
ual KEP. This helps avoid situations wherein countries
with larger KEPs dominate an mKEP. According to
results of experiment the Benefit value provide more
balanced results, so we will only consider Benefit value
in this paper.
The Benefit value is similar to the Shapley value,
that is well-known in the field of cooperative game the-
ory (Shapley 1953). The Shapley value considers the
payoffs of the participants by the concept of marginal
contributions. The contribution of this paper is to make
a comparison between the Shapley value to the Benefit
value.
mKEP as a game and Shapley value
Several articles consider an mKEP as a game. The
players of this game are the participating countries.
The value that the players can make in any coalition
S is denoted by v(S), and it is equal to the optimum
of the model M, when the countries of S collaborate.
The coalition involving all the players is called as the
grand coalition. Hence it means that the value of the
coalition is the maximal number of transplants with the
consideration of individual rationality.
The Shapley value, introduced in (Shapley 1953), is
based on the concept of the marginal contribution of
the player. The improvement that the player makes in
a particular ordering for the players joining the game
is the marginal contribution. The Shapley value is the
average of these improvements over all possible coali-
tions.
Let Θ denote all of the different orders in which the
players can enter the game. For a θ ∈ Θ order qnθ
indicates the contribution that country n adds to the
coalition when she joins. Then the Shapley value can
be calculated as:
ψn =
1
|N |!
∑
θ∈Θ
qnθ (7)
In an mKEP, qnθ is the increase of the transplants
when the country n joins to the θ ordered collaboration.
In an order, θ, the first country’s marginal contribution
is qn1θ = v(n1)− v(∅). The second one’s is qn2θ = v(n2 ∪
n1) − v(n1) and the third one’s is qn3θ = v(n3 ∪ n2 ∪
n1)−v(n2∪n1), and so on. When all of the θ orders are
considered, the (7) can be simplify to the next formula:
ψn =
∑
S⊆(N\n)
γS
[
v(S ∪ n)− v(S)] (8)
The γS =
|S|!(N−|S|−1)!
N ! denotes the probability of
the occurrence of the S coalition. Then (8) considers
every possible coalition without country n (even the
zero-coalition, when there is no one to collaborate), and
sums the effects of the inclusion of country n with the
weight of γS .
Benefit value
The Benefit value of the article (Klimentova et al.
2019) distributes the surplus of the coalition over the
sum of the individual solutions. Hence this excess (σ)
is the value of the grand coalition minus all of the result
of the separated KEPs:
σ = v(N)−
∑
i∈N
v(i) (9)
The ratio that the players can get from the surplus
depends on their contribution to the grand coalition
value. This contribution is calculated by the total im-
provement in the number of transplants if the country
joins the others:
an = v(N)− v(N \ n)− v(n) (10)
Therefore the Benefit payoff for the country n is:
ψn = v(n) + σ
an∑
i∈N ai
In the case of
∑
i∈N a
i = 0, the surplus is distributed
equally for the players:
ψn = v(n) +
σ
|N | ∀i.
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SIMULATION
We used the simulator form (Santos, Tubertini,
Viana and Pedroso 2017, Klimentova et al. 2019) to
generate a pool of mKEP that dynamically changes
over time. We investigated seven consecutive years of
the mKEP, with the matching run every 90 days (4
times a year). Over the considered years the incompat-
ible RDPs arrive, depending on the country, but stays
there minimum 60 to the maximum of 2190 days, on
average of 365 days uniformly. For the analysis of the
data, we considered the first year as a warm-up period,
to populate the pool. Hence in the statistical results,
we analysed only the last six years.
We compared the results when the countries do not
collaborate with the MP and CR type of collaborations.
For each collaboration levels, we considered the max-
imisation of the number of transplants. For the latter
two, we calculated the result of the fair model as well,
with the Shapley and the Benefit value. We restricted
the number of transplant per cycle to 3 and the number
of transplants per chains initiated by NDDs to 2.
Collaboration of same sized countries.
First, we considered a case, when three countries
with similar attributes of the pools start the coalition.
In this case, because the pools are identical, the contri-
butions also should be similar. Therefore it would make
the same effect for each country. Hence, in the long
run, the ratio of a participant gets on average should
be around 13 . We investigated this case because in this
setup, with the fair models, the effect of an additional
random contribution of a country can be more notice-
able.
In this setup, we excluded the possibilities of NDDs.
We investigated three different cases: Small, Medium
and Large which refers to the sizes of the pools. In the
Small case the pairs arrive on an average of 20 days,
in the Medium on every ten days and for the last case,
on every five days. In each case, we considered 100
randomly generated pools.
TABLE 1: Average improvement to the No-collaboration
Small Medium Large
None 45.37 104.76 231.43
CR MP CR MP CR MP
Max.Numb. 116.66% 124.06% 108.40% 114.75% 103.37% 108.13%
Benefit 116.78% 123.38% 108.46% 114.57% 103.34% 108.20%
Shapley 116.85% 123.33% 108.47% 114.54% 103.37% 108.15%
Table 1 presents the average results of the no-
collaboration and the improvement with the different
levels of collaborations and models. In every case, the
collaboration resulted in an improvement in the num-
ber of transplants. Generally, the MP resulted in much
higher transplants than the CR. The fair-models had a
similar result in the average selected pairs, as expected.
Although the result does not change too much with
the fair model, because of constraint (2), there is a tiny
difference. This difference is because the alternative
solution with the Benefit or Shapley value results in a
different pool of remainders. As the results show, the
different remaining pairs did not change the number of
the selected pairs significantly. Furthermore, interest-
ingly as the sizes of the pools increase the effect of the
collaboration on the number of transplants decreases.
Comparing the bias between the target value and the
concluded transplants
The result of the number of transplants was not
significantly different for the Shapley and the Bene-
fit value. To examine the differences, we investigated
the bias between the target value and the concluded
transplants, bias = τnt − snt+1. The bias shows the av-
erage fairness of the model. If the average of the bias is
close to zero, the participants received results that are
close to their contribution. When a participant has a
large bias, it means that her result from the model was
far from her fair solution. When the bias is positive,
the country did not get as much transplant as she has
contributed since the beginning of the collaboration.
Fig. 1: biases of the models
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
-5.0 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
bias
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Fairness
benefit
Shapley
CR - Small
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
-5.0 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
bias
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Fairness
benefit
Shapley
MP - Small
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
-5.0 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
bias
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Fairness
benefit
Shapley
CR - Medium
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
-5.0 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
bias
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Fairness
benefit
Shapley
MP - Medium
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
-5.0 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
bias
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Fairness
benefit
Shapley
CR - Large
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
-5.0 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
bias
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Fairness
benefit
Shapley
MP - Large
Figure 1 presents the cumulative distribution func-
tions of the biases. The line shows the probability of
the bias was less than or equal to the value of the x-
axis. The larger probabilities define the colour of the
area between the two lines. In general, the Shapley
value resulted in a steeper line. Therefore the biases
were more concentrated near zero, than the biases of
the Benefit value. The descriptive statistics of the bi-
ases can be seen in Table 2.
In general, the bias of the model with the Shapley
value resulted in a much smaller standard deviation.
According to Levene’s test, the difference is significant
with 1% significance level for all cases, except for the
Large MP case, which significantly differs only with
5% significance level. Also, the distance between the
minimum and maximum were higher in almost every
case with the Benefit value. Furthermore, both models
resulted in a more peaked distribution, than the stan-
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TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics of the biases
CR MP
Small Benefit Shapley Benefit Shapley
min -4.15 -2.67 min -9.25 -5.00
max 4.86 4.00 max 8.55 5.00
sd 1.11 0.78 sd 1.81 1.05
skewness 0.44 0.29 skewness -0.17 0.04
kurtosis 1.22 1.04 kurtosis 2.39 2.44
Medium Benefit Shapley Benefit Shapley
min -5.11 -4.00 min -11.79 -4.17
max 5.69 3.17 max 11.76 4.67
sd 1.13 0.84 sd 1.54 0.84
skewness 0.27 0.03 skewness -0.56 0.04
kurtosis 1.61 1.45 kurtosis 5.77 2.94
Large Benefit Shapley Benefit Shapley
min -4.53 -3.83 min -4.50 -3.83
max 5.33 5.67 max 4.07 4.33
sd 1.40 0.97 sd 0.61 0.59
skewness 0.43 0.31 skewness -0.11 -0.09
kurtosis 0.83 2.19 kurtosis 7.48 6.67
dard normal distribution (when kurtosis and skewness
equals to 0).
In summary, when the participants had similar char-
acteristics, the results on the number of transplants
were very similar for both models. However, the Shap-
ley value resulted in a less spread result on the bias.
The smaller deviation is important because it can re-
sult in a more stable mKEP.
Collaboration of different sized countries.
When the pools of the countries are not identical,
their contributions to the collaboration may be quite
different. In this section, we investigated the case when
the size of the pools differ across countries. In this case,
using a fair model is important because it would make
the mKEP more beneficial to the participants with a
high contribution to the shared pool.
To consider all possibilities (collaboration with larger
or with smaller country), we considered an instance
when three countries with different pool-sizes collabo-
rate. We analysed a case when there is a small country
with incoming pairs on 20 days average, a medium-sized
country with 10 days on average and a country with a
large pool where the RDPs register into the KEP on
average every 5 days.
The fair models change the allocation of the results,
compared to the model maximisation of the number
of transplants. To investigate which participant would
benefit from considering the fair values, we compared
the result of the fair model to the original maximisa-
tion model without the IR constraint. For the sake of
comparison of the different sized countries, we used rel-
ative changes. Therefore we calculated a relative Price
of Fairness (RPoF) indicator, which shows the relative
loss of the participant when the fair model is used.
Let v the number of transplants that a country made
by the simple maximisation model. And let the w be
the total number of transplants with the fair-model.
Then
RPoF =
v
w
− 1. (11)
Therefore if the RPoF is positive, then the partic-
ipant lost transplants when the fair model was used.
Table 3 present the RPoF results of each country.
TABLE 3: RPoF of the three different sized countries.
Small Medium Large
MP CR MP CR MP CR
Benefit 10.28% 0.04% 2.05% -0.23% -2.65% 0.14%
Shapley 9.40% 0.31% 2.37% -0.50% -2.70% 0.10%
When the collaboration was CR, the result of the
fair-model slightly differs from the maximal number of
transplants. In this case, in the first run, the set of
remaining pairs the participants share, is usually much
smaller than the original pool. Hence the effect of fair-
ness is much smaller. However, in case of the collabo-
ration is MP, then there is a much higher effect across
countries. For the small-pooled country, the RPoF is
higher. Therefore this country gets fewer transplants
with the consideration of the Fair-value. The effect
is similar but smaller for the medium-pooled country.
However, the country with the largest pool got a neg-
ative RPoF. That means with the consideration of the
fair-model, the large-pooled country gets more trans-
plant than in the case of the simple maximisation of
the number of transplants. In total, the results indicate
that the simple maximisation of the number of trans-
plants is not fair for the countries with larger pools.
Therefore in the original model, the larger pools con-
tribute excessively to the collaboration, but their ad-
vantage from the collaboration is smaller.
The results of the Benefit and the Shapley values
slightly differ. In the case of the Shapley value, the
medium-pooled country gets a somewhat fewer trans-
plant, and the smaller one gets more.
Effects of NDDs
In the previous tests, we did not consider any NDDs.
In this section, we investigate the effects when one of
the participants allows NDDs in her pool. We inves-
tigated the cases where the NDDs could arrive at the
pool in 180 days on average.
We again considered three country cases. Among
the three countries, two have equal-sized pools, and the
third one has a Large-pool. We chose this setup, to in-
vestigate the effect of the same sized pools with NDDs
and the different sized pools with NDDs at the same
time. With the principle of ceteris paribus, we com-
pared three different instances: There are no NDDs;
One of the small pooled countries has NDDs; the Large
country has NDDs. With these instances, we would in-
vestigate the effect when a similar country, a larger one,
or a smaller country, has NDDs. However, for the com-
parison, we calculated the results without any NDDs
as well.
Table 4 presents the RPoF when no country has
NDDs. The fair models in the collaboration level of
CR has almost zero effect compared to the simple max-
imisation of the number of transplants. In the case
of MP, the small countries benefited more from the
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TABLE 4: RPoF:No country has NDDs
MP CR
Large Small Small-2 Large Small Small-2
Beneit -2.39% 7.94% 5.25% 0.32% 0.23% -1.14%
Shapley -2.40% 8.39% 5.50% 0.31% 0.26% -0.87%
model without fair-values. When a small pool with
a larger one merges, the pairs from the smaller one has
a much higher chance for transplantation. However,
the pairs from the larger pool do not have that much
increase. Hence the smaller countries contribution was
much smaller. The large country, on the other hand,
had a more significant effect on the transplants num-
ber. Therefore the country with the largest pool size
would get more transplant with the fair model.
TABLE 5: RPoF: One small country has NDDs
MP CR
Large Small Small-NDD Large Small Small-NDD
Beneit 1.14% 11.12% -11.69% 0.62% 0.63% -1.97%
Shapley 0.99% 10.90% -11.05% 0.57% 0.43% -2.02%
In the case, when one small country can have NDDs,
with the fair model, this country gets an improvement
in the number of transplants. Furthermore, in this case,
the large-pooled country has a slightly positive RPoF,
which means it loses transplants in the fair instances.
Interestingly it leads to a conclusion that even a few
NDDs (registered on every half-year on average) can
have more effects on the contribution to the collabora-
tion than the size of the pool. Therefore the RPoF of
the small country with NDDs became negative while
the Large country’s RPoF shifted positively. The other
small-pooled country has even more reduction in the
number of transplants compared to the original case
without NDDs.
TABLE 6: RPoF:Large pooled country has NDDs
MP CR
Large-NDD Small Small-2 Large-NDD Small Small-2
Beneit -4.27% 13.44% 8.32% 0.24% 1.17% -0.86%
Shapley -4.38% 13.11% 8.94% 0.13% 0.98% -0.59%
As in Table 4, the simple maximisation model is un-
fair against the larger-pooled countries. Furthermore,
Table 5 shows that the NDDs made more effect on the
level of contribution to the collaboration than the size
of the large country. Moreover, we investigated when
only the largest-pooled country has NDDs. Unsurpris-
ingly the large-pooled country with NDDs got an even
more significant improvement on the number of trans-
plants when the fair model was applied. The RPoF of
this situation is shown in table 6. While in the no-
NDDs case, the increase of the fair model was around
2.4%, with NDDs the improvement increased to around
4.3%.
Effects of NDDs on transplants
Permitting NDDs in the multinational case may have
a higher effect on other countries. For this, we consid-
ered every chain, initiated by a NDD and calculated
the number of recipients of each country. Hence, figure
2 presents the distribution of those transplants, which
concluded because of a NDD.
Fig. 2: Effects of the NDDs
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In the left side of figure 2, there is the effect of the
small country’s NDDs. Interestingly the NDDs resulted
in more improvement for the Large country than the
country of the NDDs. The fair-models somewhat re-
duce the difference, but still, the Large country remains
the most affected. The other small country gets a bit
of improvement because of the NDDs, but she also lost
some transplant because of the fair values.
On the right side, there is the effect when the larger
country permits NDDs. The Large country gets the
most improvement in this case, similarly to the other
case. Due to the provider of these donors are also the
Large country, the fair values improve her results.
CONCLUSION
We concluded some tests over the Shapley value and
the Benefit value. We used a multi-period simulation of
an mKEP with three countries. The Shapley- and Ben-
efit value resulted in a similar result in the number of
transplants. However, the Shapley value has a slightly
better result, on the bias, a.k.a the temporary unfair-
ness of the mKEP. The bias of the Shapley value had a
much smaller standard deviation in most of the cases.
In general, the fair model gives an improvement of the
countries with a larger pool. Hence their contribution
is more relevant in the collaboration. The inclusion of
NDDs mostly affected the country with larger pools.
Hence when one smaller country has NDDs, they get
more benefit from the fair-model.
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